

## Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 OTTAWA 03625 01 OF 02 200137Z  
ACTION PM-05

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 OMB-01 NSC-05 ACDA-12 AID-05  
TRSE-00 SS-15 HA-05 SP-02 L-03 H-01 CIAE-00  
INR-10 NSAE-00 ICA-11 EB-08 COME-00 /096 W  
-----105837 200151Z /75

P R 192300Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000  
INFO SECDEF WASHDC  
JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
USCINCEUR

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 2 OTTAWA 3625

DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS ACDA AND AID

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: MASS, MPOL, CA  
SUBJECT: SECURITY ASSISTANCE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS:  
CANADA

REF: STATE 167901

1. FOLLOWING ARE EMBASSY RESPONSES TO REFTEL QUESTIONS  
3A(1) THROUGH (6) AND 3A(11) AND (12). EACH ANSWER IS  
KEYED TO NUMBER AND LETTER OF REFTEL QUESTIONS.
2. OTHER REFTEL QUESTIONS ARE EITHER NOT APPLICABLE TO  
CANADIAN SITUATION OR DO NOT REQUIRE INFORMATION AT PRESENT  
TIME.

3A(1) THE UNITED STATES IS NOT PROVIDING FUNDS TO CANADA  
FOR MAP, FMS FINANCING, OR IMET. THE SECURITY RELATIONSHIP  
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND CANADA CAN BEST BE CHAR-  
ACTERIZED AS A SERIES OF COOPERATIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS  
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PAGE 02 OTTAWA 03625 01 OF 02 200137Z

PURSUED UNDER SUCH AGREEMENTS AND AUSPICES AS NORAD, THE  
DEFENSE PRODUCTION SHARING ARRANGEMENT, DEFENSE RESEARCH  
AND DEVELOPMENT SHARING, THE PERMANENT JOINT BOARD OF  
DEFENSE, THE MILITARY COOPERATION COMMITTEE, AND THE CANUS  
REGIONAL PLANNING GROUP. THESE ARRANGEMENTS SERVE U.S.  
INTERESTS BY FACILITATING U.S.-CANADIAN COOPERATION IN THE  
DEFENSE OF NORTH AMERICA, IN THE PROTECTION OF OUR MANY

COMMON INTERESTS IN OTHER AREAS, AND IN BUILDING A MORE EFFECTIVE INDUSTRIAL BASE IN NORTH AMERICA FOR THE JOINT SECURITY OF THE TWO NATIONS. U.S. SECURITY OBJECTIVES IN CANADA INCLUDE:

AA A. TO ENCOURAGE AND ENABLE CANADA TO STRENGTHEN ITS MILITARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO AND NORAD.

-- B. TO ENCOURAGE CANADIAN SUPPORT OF U.S. PROPOSALS IN THE NATO AND NORAD ARENAS--FOR EXAMPLE, REGARDING RATIONALIZATION, STANDARDIZATION, AND INTEROPERABILITY (RSI).

-- C. TO ENCOURAGE THE MAINTENANCE OF A VIABLE DEFENSE INDUSTRY IN CANADA THAT COULD BE CALLED UPON IN THE CASE OF AN EMERGENCY.

-- D. TO ENCOURAGE AND ENABLE CANADA TO CONTINUE ITS ROLE AS A MAJOR PARTICIPANT IN U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

3A(2) THE THREAT:

-- A. EXTERNAL THREAT:

-- (1) THERE IS GENERAL AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE U.S. CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 OTTAWA 03625 01 OF 02 200137Z

AND CANADA CONCERNING THE MOST IMPORTANT THREATS TO THE SECURITY OF THE WESTERN WORLD. CANADA EXPECTS TARGETS IN CANADIAN TERRITORY TO BE STRUCK IN THE CASE OF A COMMUNIST NUCLEAR ATTACK ON NORTH AMERICA. CANADA ALSO RECOGNIZES THE RISKS ASSOCIATED WITH ALLOWING A MAJOR IMBALANCE OF FORCES TO DEVELOP IN EUROPE.

-- (2) CANADA'S STRATEGY FOR MEETING THE THREAT IT PERCEIVES IS BUILT AROUND:

-- (A) PARTICIPATING IN COLLECTIVE SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, I.E., NORAD, NATO, U.N. PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

(B) PREVENTION OF NUCLEAR WAR, IN THE MILITARY ARENA BY CONTRIBUTING TO A SYSTEM OF STABLE MUTUAL DETERRENCE, I.E., IN NORTH AMERICA BY ASSISTING THE U.S. IN OPERATING A DEFENSE AND WARNING SYSTEM AND PROVIDING DEFENSIVE FORCES AGAINST THREATENING BOMBER AND MARITIME OPERATIONS; IN NATO BY CONTRIBUTING TO THE MAINTENANCE OF A BALANCE OF POWER.

(C) MAINTENANCE OF CANADIAN MILITARY FORCES  
IN WARTIME PRIMARILY FOR OPERATION AS PART OF A MULTILATERAL  
FORCE, BUT ALSO WITH RESPONSIBILITIES TO PROTECT THE  
PEACETIME SOVEREIGNTY OF CANADIAN LAND, SEA, AND AIR SPACE.

B. INTERNAL THREAT: THE PARTI QUEBECOIS (PQ)  
GOVERNS THE PROVINCE OF QUEBEC WITH THE PRINCIPAL AIM OF  
TAKING THAT PROVINCE OUT OF THE CANADIAN CONFEDERATION.  
SUCH A MOVE COULD PROVE FATAL TO THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE.  
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS INDICATED IT WILL NOT INTERVENE

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PAGE 01 OTTAWA 03625 02 OF 02 200119Z  
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TRSE-00 SS-15 HA-05 SP-02 L-03 H-01 CIAE-00  
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-----105697 200152Z /75

P R 192300Z JUL 78  
FM AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0000  
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JCS WASHDC  
USMISSION USNATO  
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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 2 OTTAWA 3625

WITH FORCE IF THE MAJORITY OF QUEBECOIS DECLARE THEIR DE-  
SIRE FOR INDEPENDENT OR QUASI-INDEPENDENT STATUS IN A FREE  
VOTE. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT HAS SUGGESTED, HOWEVER, THAT  
IT MIGHT USE FORCE TO KEEP QUEBEC IN CONFEDERATION IF THE  
QUEBEC GOVERNMENT ATTEMPTS TO SEPARATE WITHOUT THE DE-  
CLARED BACKING OF THE MAJORITY OF QUEBECOIS.

THE INTERNAL THREAT TO CANADA LIES IN BOTH THE PEACEFUL  
SEPARATION OF QUEBEC AND AN ATTEMPTED SEPARATION (WITHOUT  
MAJORITY BACKING) CAUSING VIOLENCE. THE FEDERAL GOVERN-  
MENT IS ATTEMPTING TO COUNTER THE FORMER WITH A CAMPAIGN  
TO COINVINCING QUEBECOIS THAT THEIR FUTURE LIES WITH CANADA  
AND NOT WITH INDEPENDENCE. FEDERAL STRATEGY TO COUNTER  
THE LATTER, I.E. PARTITION WITHOUT MAJORITY SUPPORT AND  
WITH LIKELY VIOLENCE, IS BEING VERY CLOSELY HELD, FOR  
OBVIOUS REASONS. IT IS SAFE TO ASSUME THAT THE FEDERAL  
GOVERNMENT HAS MILITARY CONTINGENCY PLANNING FOR THIS

EVENT, BUT THE EMBASSY IS NOT PRIVY TO THIS PLANNING. INDEED, WE CAN ONLY SPECULATE ON THE EXISTENCE OF SUCH PLANNING SINCE THERE HAS BEEN NO PUBLIC OR PRIVATE DISCLOSURE OF IT. AT THIS STAGE, WE BELIEVE THAT THE ODDS CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 02 OTTAWA 03625 02 OF 02 200119Z

ARE AGAINST QUEBEC'S BECOMING AN INDEPENDENT STATE.

3A(3) THE EMBASSY GENERALLY CONCURS WITH CANADA'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE THAT U.S. INTERESTS CAN BEST BE SERVED BY FOCUSING THE CANADIAN DEFENSE EFFORT ON STRENGTHENING ITS CAPABILITY FOR MAKING CONTRIBUTIONS TO NATO AND NORAD RATHER THAN FOCUSING ON THE PEACETIME PROTECTION OF CANADIAN SOVEREIGNTY. THE LATEST PUBLIC STATEMENT OF CANADA'S DEFENSE PRIORITIES, PUBLISHED IN 1971, PLACES TOP PRIORITY ON THE PROTECTION OF THAT SOVEREIGNTY. THAT PAPER IS PRESENTLY UNDER REVISION, HOWEVER, AND REPORTEDLY THE NEW PAPER WILL PUT MORE EMPHASIS ON WAR FIGHTING CAPABILITIES.

3A(4) OF THE NATO NATIONS, CANADA RANKS AMONG THE LOWEST IN THE RATIOS OF ITS DEFENSE SPENDING TO ITS GNP AND ITS PER CAPITA INCOME. WITH THAT LIMITED BUDGET, IT MAINTAINS A FORCE CONSISTING OF LAND, SEA, AND AIR ELEMENTS. DURING THE LATE SIXTIES AND EARLY SEVENTIES, THE GOC SEVERELY LIMITED ITS INVESTMENT IN NEW CAPITAL EQUIPMENT FOR ITS MILITARY FORCES. HOWEVER, IN MORE RECENT YEARS, IT HAS UNDERTAKEN TO INCREASE IN REAL TERMS ITS CAPITAL EXPENDITURE BUDGET BY 12 PERCENT PER YEAR UNTIL THAT PART OF ITS DEFENSE EXPENDITURES BECOMES 20 PERCENT OF ITS OVERALL DEFENSE BUDGET. NEW CAPITAL INVESTMENT HAS BEEN OR IS EXPECTED TO BE MADE IN TANKS, ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS, PATROL AND FIGHTER AIRCRAFT, AIR DEFENSE CONTROL CENTERS, AND A SHIPBUILDING PROGRAM, WHILE ALSO INCREASING THE NUMBER OF MILITARY PERSONNEL ON ACTIVE DUTY.

3A(5) THE U.S. HAS ATTEMPTED TO INFLUENCE CANADA TO INCREASE ITS ALLOCATIONS TO THE DEFENSE SPHERE-PARTICULARLY IN NATO WHERE CANADA'S SMALL CONTRIBUTION RELATIVE TO ITS CONFIDENTIAL

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PAGE 03 OTTAWA 03625 02 OF 02 200119Z

CAPABILITY OFFERS TO OTHER NATO NATIONS AN EXCUSE FOR MINIMAL DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS. DESPITE ITS PRESENT MODERNIZATION PROGRAM, WHICH IS EXPECTED TO STRENGTHEN CANADA'S CAPABILITY TO CONTRIBUTE TO BOTH NATO AND NORAD, CANADA DEFENSE ALLOCATIONS REMAIN SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN WHAT

THE U.S. WOULD CONSIDER APPROPRIATE. CONCERNING THE AREAS WHERE CANADA IS MODERNIZING ITS FORCES, THE U.S. INTERESTS ARE BEING WELL-SERVED: THE BULK OF THE NEW EQUIPMENT WILL IMPROVE CANADA'S CAPABILITIES IN NORAD AND NATO. CANADA IS ALSO UNDERTAKING TO IMPROVE ITS PEACEKEEPING CAPABILITIES, BY SUCH MEASURES AS CROSS TRAINING RADIO AND TELETYPE PERSONNEL TO PROVIDE A LARGER BASE FROM WHICH TO DRAW COMMUNICATIONS PERSONNEL FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS.

3A(6) MILITARY EXPENDITURES (UNDER NATO DEFINITION) FOR FY 1977/78 WERE 11 PERCENT OF CANADIAN GOVERNMENT SPENDING AND 2 PERCENT OF CANADIAN GNP. DATA ON MILITARY IMPORTS AS A PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL IMPORTS ARE NOT AVAILABLE TO THE EMBASSY. CANADA HAS NO FOREIGN EXCHANGE OR DEBT SERVICING PROBLEMS.

3A(11) IN GENERAL TERMS, THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN CANADA IS ESSENTIALLY THE SAME AS THAT IN THE UNITED STATES, AND THERE ARE NO GROSS VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS. THERE IS, THEREFORE, NO CONNECTION BETWEEN CANADA'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD AND ITS SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE U.S.

3A(12) NONE. ENDERS

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## Message Attributes

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**Current Classification:** UNCLASSIFIED  
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**Control Number:** n/a  
**Copy:** SINGLE  
**Draft Date:** 19 jul 1978  
**Decaption Date:** 01 jan 1960  
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**To:** STATE  
**Type:** TE  
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